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Deportation	targets	in	the	Home	Office:	a	long	and
troubled	history
While	the	government	has	apologised	for	the	treatment	of	Windrush	citizens,	Amber	Rudd	has
resigned	over	her	lack	of	knowledge	about	the	Home	Office’s	removals	targets.	Christina	Boswell
provides	some	context	to	recent	events.	She	concludes	that	although	deportation	targets	are	a
problematic	tool	of	performance	measurement,	the	culture	that	exists	within	the	government	makes	it
very	difficult	to	go	without	it.
The	recent	scandal	over	removals	targets	has	focused	attention	on	the	so-called	‘target	culture’	that	is
rife	in	the	Home	Office.	In	fact,	the	organization	has	been	driven	by	targets	since	the	early	years	of	the	Blair
administration.	A	series	of	ambitious	‘stretch’	targets	were	rolled	out	as	part	of	the	system	of	Public	Service
Agreements	as	early	as	2000.
Initially,	the	targets	were	focused	on	making	the	asylum	system	more	efficient.	A	target	on	the	processing	of	asylum
applications	aimed	to	speed	up	the	turnaround	of	decision-making	on	cases.	While	a	further	target	on	removals	(yes,
they	go	back	that	far),	aimed	to	increase	the	number	of	rejected	asylum	seekers	who	were	removed	from	the
country.	In	this	initial	phase,	the	targets	were	largely	about	managing	internal	performance	within	the	Home	Office	–
what	I’ve	called	the	‘disciplining’	function	of	targets.	And	they	were	not	popular	within	the	Home	Office	–	officials
talked	of	targets	as	a	‘necessary	evil’	for	securing	resources	from	the	Treasury.
However,	as	asylum	numbers	continued	to	increase	in	the	early	2000s,	Tony	Blair	came	under	severe	media	and
political	pressure	to	show	he	was	managing	the	problem.	In	February	2003	he	announced	a	target	of	halving	the
number	of	people	seeking	asylum	in	the	UK	–	a	high-profile	target,	aimed	at	signalling	the	government’s	commitment
to	tackle	the	issue.	It	was	also	a	controversial	target,	as	it	implied	deterring	or	preventing	asylum-seekers	from
coming	to	the	UK	(rather	than	streamlining	asylum	procedures	once	they	were	here).	And	it	was	a	hugely	ambitious
target,	greeted	with	scepticism	and	derision	by	the	press	–	the	left	objecting	on	ethical	grounds,	the	right	on	grounds
of	its	feasibility.
David	Blunkett’s	Home	Office	did	go	on	to	meet	the	target	–	though	how	far	this	was	a	result	of	changing	conditions
in	countries	of	origin	is	still	debated.	However,	its	success	received	a	lukewarm	reception	in	the	media,	teaching	the
government	that	targets	do	not	always	serve	well	as	tools	of	political	communication.
Targets	were	again	deployed	in	2006,	to	address	criticism	of	the	Home	Office	in	the	wake	of	the	‘foreign	national
offenders’	scandal.	This	was	the	revelation	that	a	hundred	or	so	non-UK	nationals	had	been	released	from	prison
after	serving	their	sentence,	without	being	considered	by	the	Home	Office	for	deportation.	Removals	were	once
again	in	the	spotlight,	with	officials	and	ministers	grilled	by	select	committees	over	their	failure	to	remove	around	400-
450,000	rejected	asylum	applicants.	John	Reid,	newly	instated	as	Home	Secretary,	introduced	new	targets	to	clear
the	asylum	‘backlog’,	including	an	ambitious	removals	target.
In	the	second	half	of	the	2000s,	asylum	figures	were	declining	and	the	issue	began	to	recede	from	media	and
political	attention.	Yet	by	then,	the	target	culture	had	taken	a	firm	grip	on	the	Home	Office	and	the	UK	Border
Agency.	As	one	former	special	advisor	told	me,	it	had	‘morphed	into	a	more	technocratic	approach’,	with	a	very
complicated	architecture’.
As	these	targets	became	increasingly	complex	and	technical,	they	began	to	lose	their	purpose	as	tools	of	political
communication	–	or	‘signaling’	function	–	becoming	more	about	internal	organization.	Indeed,	they	became	a
thoroughly	normal	tool	of	Home	Office	management.	One	senior	official	told	me	they	had	tried	to	do	without	targets
for	asylum	processing,	but	quickly	reintroduced	them	as	they	had	lost	they	‘didn’t	know	what	success	looked	like’.
By	the	end	of	the	decade,	targets	were	falling	into	disrepute.	They	were	criticised	as	clunky,	distorting	and
simplifying;	they	encouraged	gaming,	and	their	centralising	tendency	stifled	initiative.	The	Conservatives	and	their	Lib
Dem	coalition	partners	vowed	to	eschew	targets	–	especially	as	a	signalling	device.
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Of	course,	there	was	one	prominent	exception:	the	net	migration	target,	announced	by	David	Cameron	in	early	2010.
This	target,	as	is	well-known,	has	been	a	ruthless	driver	of	immigration	policy,	affecting	all	aspects	of	immigration
policy	that	might	have	a	bearing	on	the	numbers	admitted,	as	well	as	those	leaving	the	UK.	Thus	it	has	affected
policies	on	family	migration,	foreign	students	and	labour	migration,	as	well	as,	of	course,	influencing	the	decision	to
leave	the	EU.
It	was	natural	that	the	net	migration	goal	would	be	codified	as	a	set	of	more	specific	targets	–	the	Home	Office’s	go-to
tool	for	performance	management.	And	also	to	be	expected	that	the	targets	would	extend	to	implementation	of	the
‘hostile	environment’	–	Theresa	May’s	policy	of	enforcing	immigration	controls	through	outsourcing	checks	to	a	range
of	service	providers,	including	employers,	landlords,	banks,	education	and	health	providers.
For	me,	the	surprise	is	more	in	the	way	the	media	and	parliamentary	system	has	reacted	to	target-gate.	We	have
had	almost	two	decades	of	opposition	parties,	select	communities	and	the	media	grilling	governments	on	their	failure
to	meet	removals	targets.	This	criticism	has	now	been	turned	on	its	head:	the	fault	lies	in	setting	such	clunky	and
unethical	targets	in	the	first	place	–	not	in	the	failure	to	meet	them.
This	is	a	welcome	development,	casting	the	spotlight	as	it	does	on	the	distorting	effects	of	Home	Office	targets.	It
implies	that	politicians	may	in	the	future	be	more	cautious	about	their	use	of	targets.	Unfortunately,	though,	I	suspect
that	targets	will	continue	to	drive	internal	performance	systems	within	the	Home	Office.	Once	you’re	hooked	on	this
tool	of	performance	measurement,	it	proves	very	difficult	to	go	without	it.
______
Note:	You	can	read	more	about	the	target	culture	in	UK	government	in	Christina’s	new	book;	more	information	on	the
ESRC	project	underpinning	the	research	is	available	here;	and	a	blog	summarising	the	project	findings	is	available
here.
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